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1.  Introduction
This paper uses the Peruvian Living Standard Survey (PLSS) data to analyze (a) inequality in the distribution
of Income, (b) labor market participation of men and women and the variations in hours of work, and (c) the relation-
ship between variations In labor supply and Income Inequality. We use a decomposing  method to analyze income
Inequality.  Furthermore, we utilize a structural neo-classical model to analyze household  production, consumption,
time allocation and welfare.  The purpose Is to study the effect on production,  consumption, and time allocation of
changes in education and wage rates.  For example, how many men and women would  participate in wage work
if education were Increased?  And how would  policy changes affect the mean level and the degree of inequality in
the distribution of economic  weffare?
Most of the available information on economic Inequality in developing countries  refers to the distribution
of  Income among eamers.  Although this Information constitutes an important element for understanding the labor
market and the related distribution of income, it is less helpful In  the analysis of inequality as a welfare issue.  A more
relevant indicator of welfare is per capita (or per adult equivalent) household income or consumption.  This paper
uses this Indicator in an analysis of economic  inequality.  Our methodological  approach  is based on a summary
measure of  inequality which is closely related to the Gini coefficient.  The essential difference is that our proposed
measure of inequality gives more weight than the Gini coefficient to transfers related to the veiy poor.
Based on the estimates of an econometric model of  production,  consumption  and time allocation, we  have
examined the Impact of changes in wage rates and education on economic inequality.  In particular we demonstrate
how female labor and education affect economic  inequality among  households.
The structural econometric  model we develop and estimate Is convenient for simulating  certain types of
policy experiments.  It is of  particular interest to  apply empirically founded  behavioral models to  assess the labor
supply  response and the  corresponding  Impact on economic  welfare from various policy  measures.  SpecHfically,
given similar economic  cond-tions in Peru as of 1985,  our study suggests what we may be able to achieve, and how,
for  example, different measures would  affect economic inequelity.
The theoretical model Is based on the neoclassical model for consumption  and time allocation.  Provided
the data are not corrupted by  measurement error, this framework is useful since:
*  No one can spend more than his or her income.  (In other words the budget constraint plays a
role.)
*  There is  also a time constraint of 24 hours a day.-2  -
it is reasonable  to assume  that people  are  not indifferent  with respect to different levels  of lelsure
and consumption. Thus  we introduce  the notion  of preferences  and represent  them by utility
indexes.
In standard  models  of labor  supply  the decision-maker  Is assumed  to maximize  utility  with respect  to leisure
and consumption  (subject  to the budget  constraint).  One objection  to this framework,  however,  Is that individuals
and households  in developing  countries  can hardly  be viewed  as having  full freedom  of choice.  On  the contrary
their job and production  opportunities  are  often severely  constrained. An Individual's  opportunities  are influenced
by education  and experience,  by the sinicture  of the economy,  and by govemment  and sector-speclffc  policies.
Thus It Is crucial that a realistic  economic  model  of household  behavior  accommodate  variations  in opportunities
across households.
The  econometric  model  used  in this study differs  somewhat  from the standard  models  in that  the undertying
decision  variable  Is latent  and Is denoted  position. By position  we mean  a particular  combination  of market  and
nonmarket  activities,  such as agricultural  production  combined  with work In a wage-eaming  job.  A position is
characterized  by specific  attributes,  like type and level  of output  and input  factors, hours  of work, wage rates,  and
so on.  These  attributes  are  assumed  fixed, given  the positon.  The  choice problem  Is viewed  as one In which the
household  selects  the best package,  of attributes  from a set.  This choice set Is known to the household  but Is
unobservable  to econometriclans.
The  set of household-specHifc  feasible  posiions Is represented  In  the model  by a distribution  functlon  called
the  oPoortunitv  distribution (density).  The opportunity density represents  an  aggregate measure of choice
opportunities  and it Is defined  as the fraction  of positions  with specffied  levels  of attributes  that are  feasible  to the
household. For example,  if the attributes  are job-specific  hours,  wages, and profits  In own-farm  production,  the
opportunity  density measures  the amount of positions  with a specific  level of wages, hours, and profts that Is
feasible.  Due  to unobserved  heterogeneity  in opportunities  across  households,  it is  natural  to Interpret  the opportunRty
density  as a grobabillty density.  Specifically,  it is the pr  ~bability  that a particular  posiion-specific  combination  of
attributes  is feasible  to a (randomly  selected)  household. 11
The econometric  model  Is simultaneous  in consumption,  hours  of work,  wage rates,  and proft condRitonal
on family size  and schooling. By conditional  we mean  that  we have  specified  a conditional  density  for chosen  hours
of work, consumption,  wage rates,  and output given the chosen  family size and schooling. Thus the model Is
consistent  with the notion of simultaneous  choice In all the attributes  including  schooling  and family size.
1  This approach  was developed  and applied  by Dagsvik  (1988)  and Dagsvik  and Strom  (1989),  and it is
related  to the models  developed  by McFadden  (1973)  and Ben-Akiva  and others (1985).-3  -
While the Introduction  of the opportunity  ciistribution  In addition  to the specification  of a household  utility
function Is appealing,  It raises  problems  of functional  form and the identffication  of parameters  of the opportunity
density and utility function.  Even if these parameters  cannot be fully identified  without strong assumptions,  tl a
formulation  has the advantage  in that It suggests  a natural  and convenient  way of taking into account  unobserved
heterogeneity  In opportunities  and introduces variables  for  Individual  qualifications  as well as variables that
characterize  the community  and  the environment.  At this stage  the opportunity  density  Is specified  as a function  of
the indMidual's  education.  Specifically,  the  fraction  of feasible  wage  work positions  is specified  as a function  of years
of schooling. Similarly  the fraction of nonagricultural  self-ernpi-yment  postlions  Is specified  as a function of level
of schooling. This enables us to simulate  the effect  of Increased  education  on the allocation  of time in different
sectors while keeping wage rates and preferences  tfxed.  We can also study the effect of schooling through
Increased  wages  while keeping  the opportunity  density  fixed.
The  labor  supply functions  that correspond  to the util:ty  function are  not linear  In the parameters But our
assumptions  imply convenient  expression  for the probability  distribution of (observed)  consumption  and labor
supply.  This distribution  is a function of the parameters  of the utility  function  and it is used  in a maximum  likelihood
estimation  procedure. Once the parameters  of the utility  function  have  been estimated,  we can simulate  individual
household  response.
This paper  Is organized  In  the following  way. Section  two presents  a brief  discussion  on the methodology
of measuring  economic  Inequditv and then applies  the methodology  on observed  distributions  . rs of work,
household  Income,  and per  capita  income  as a measure  of welfare.  Section  three  outlines  the structural  econometric
model.  Section  four reports  the estimation  resufts  for the econometric  model. Section  five discussas  the policy
simulation  results. The resuits  are summarized  and policy implications  discussed  In the concluding  section  of the
paper.
2.  Labor  Market  Activitv.  Incomne  Formation,  and Welfare
This section supplements  the information  on labor market  activity  and distribution  of weltfare  reported  In
Newman  (1987)  and Glewwe  (1987). One objective  Is to examine  the relative  differences  in hours of work among
employed  males  and females  by estimating  the inequality  in  the actual  distribution  of hours  of work. For this  purpose
we employ a Gini-related  measure  of inequality,  which also represents  our basis  for studying  the distribution  of
income  and welfare.
Second, we identify the contribution  from wage work, agricultural  self-employment,  nonagricultural  self-
employment,  and unpaid  fe-  v work to the distribution  of hours of work by employed  males  and females. More4.-
precisely  we decompose  the Inequality  In the actual  distribution  of hours of work.  We use a similar approach  to
assess  the contribution  of wage  eaming- of males,  females,  and children  to the level  of inequalky  in the distribution
of household consumption.  In this way we obtain Important  Information  about economic structure and the
functioning  of the labor  market.  This information  Is, however,  less nelp  .i the ana.ysis  of economic  inequality  from
a welfare  perspectve. A more relevant  Indicator  of welfare  Is per capita  household  Income,  which  also constitutes
the basic  variable  In our study on welfare.
2.1.  Measurement  and Decomoositlon  of Ineaualitv
A common  approach  for measurlng  Inequality  In distributions  of Income  Is to employ  the Gini coefficient,
which  satisfes  the principles  of scale  invariance  and transfers.  The  principle  of scale  invariance  states  that  inequality
should remain  unaffected  n  each Income  is altered  by the same  proportion  and t requires,  therefore,  the Inequality
measure  to be independent  of the scale  of measurement.  The principle  of transfers  implies that If a transfer  of
Income  takes place  from a richer  to a poorer  person  without  changes  in the relative  posAions,  the level of inR-ualiky
diminishes.  The  reader  is referred  to Sen (1972)  for a more  comprehensive  discussion  of the normative  implications
of different  measures  of Inequwlity.-5-
Th.e  Gini coefficient  (G) is related  to the Lorenz  curve (L) In the following  way
1
(2.1)  G  =  1 t1-2L(u)Jdu.
0
The Gini coefficient  offers a method  for ranking  distributions  and quantifying  the dffferences  In inequality  between
distributions. This strategy,  however,  suffers  from certain  Inconveniences.  Evidently  no single measure  can reflect
all aspects  of inequality  of a distribution,  H  can only summarize  it to a certain  extent. Consequently,  It is Important
to have aitematives  to the Gini coefficient. As pointed out by Atkinson  (1970),  the Gini-coefficient  assigns more
weight  to transfers  In  the centre  of an unimodal  distribution  than at  the tai s. As an altemative  to the Gini coefficient,
we will employ  an Inequality  measure  -the A-coefficient  -that assigns  more  weight  to transfers  at  the lower  tall  than
at the centre and the upper  tall.
The A-coefficient  (see  Aaberge  1986)  has a similar  geometric  Interpretation  and relation  to the Inequality
curve M defined  by
(2.2) M(u)  =E iXX  s  Fu.l,  o  u s 1,
EX
as the Gini-coefficient  has  to the Lorenz  curve. Here  X has distribution  function  F.  The  A-coefficient  Is defined  by
1
(2.3)  A  =  1  [1-M(u)]du.
0
If X is an income  variable,  then M(u) for a fixed u expresses  the ratio of the mean income  of the poorest 100u
percent  of the population  to the mean income  of the population. The egaiitarian  line of the Lorenz  curve is the
straight  line joining  the points (0,0)  and (1,1). The  egaiitarian  line of the M-curve  Is the hlorizontal  line joining the
points (0,1)  and (1,1). Thus  the universe  of M- curves  Is bounded  by a unit square,  while  the universe  of Lorenz
curves  is bounded  by a triangle. Therefore,  there is a sharper  visual  distinction  between  two dtfferent  M-curves  than
between  the two corresponding  Lorenz  curves. Note  that the M- curve  will be equal  to the diagonal  line (M(u)=u)
i  and only n  the underlying  distribution  is uniform  (0,a)  for an arbritary  chosen  a. The A-coefficient  then  takes the
value 0.5, while  the maximum  attainable  value is 1 and the minimum  attainable  value Is 0.
Note that M(u) = L(u)/u,  which implies
1
(2.4)  A  =  1-_L(u  du .
u
0-6-
Alternative  expressions  for G and A are given by
-0  ye
(2-5)  G  =  r  r  (y-x)dF(x)dF(Y)  EX  r  y(2F(y)-1)dF(y)
0  0  0
and
e  y  e
(2-6)  A=  1  rr  i  =Jx
EX  J  A  F(y) dF(x)dF(y)  y  E  Y(1+lo9F(y))dF(y),
0  0  0
respectively.
Given  the inequality  In the distribution  function F measured  by A or G, the next step Is to Iderify the
sources tilat make  substantial  contributions  to the Inequality. Assume that the mair  variable  X is the sum of s
dffferent  factor components,
(2.7)  X  =  z  X
1=1
According  to Aaberge  (1986),  A and G satisfy  the following  decomposition  rules
(2.8)  A  =  A  _
1=1  IL
where  L /it is the ratio between  the means  of X. and X, respectively,  and ai  iS, loosely  spoken,  the conditional  A-
inequality  of factor I given  the units rank  order in X.  Analogously,
s  iL
(2.9)  G  =  z  _  Y
i=1  I
where YL  related  to G has a similar  interpretatio'  aS aL related  to A.
Notice  that a,  and YL are measures  of Interaction  between  factor 1,  X.,  and the sum X.  Assume  for
example  that  ii  > 0. Then,  a negative  value  of al cr  Y. expresses  negative  Interaction  and means  that  factcr I has
an equalizing  effect  on the inequality  in the distribution  F of X. A positive  value  expresses  a disequalizing  effect  on
the inequality  In F.  For t,  <  0, then positive  values  of a, and YL express  an equalking  effect  on the inequality  in
F.  For ILL < 0, then positive  valr  es of a. and Y. express  an equalizing  effect  on the inequality  in F.
2.2.  lnep  liitv in Distributions  of Hours of Work  for Males  and Females-7  -
In this section  we focus on the distribution  of hours  of work among  employed  persons. The objective  is
to estimate  inequality  In distributlons  of hours of work, I.e., elative  dffferences  in hours of work among  employed
persons. A similar  study for children  and households  is reported  in Aaberge  and Dagsvik  (1990).
Table 1.  Employment  Rates,  Annual Mean Hours  of Work and A-inequality  In Distributions  of Hours of Work  for
Males  and Married  and Unmarrieri  .emales, by Region
Females
Males  All  Married  Unmarried
Em-  An-  Em-  An-  Em-  An-  Em-  An-
ploy-  nual  ploy-  nual  ploy-  nual  ploy-  nual
ment  mean A-  ment  mean A-  ment  mean A-  ment  mean A-
rates  hours inequality  rates  hours Inequality  rates  hours Inequality  rates  hours inequality
Peru  .82  2,351  .396(.004) .64  1.746  .b21(.004)  .69  1,728 .521(.005)  .57  1,775  .521(.006)
Lima  .77  2,356  .398(.008) .51  1,594  .569(.008)  .55  1,580 .586(.011)  .47  1,611  .547(.012)
Other
urban  .76  2,286  .434(.008) .56  1,656  .563(.007)  .62  1,613  .573(.009)  .49  1,717  .546(.011)
Rural  .91  2,388  .370(.006) .79  1,8S8 .467(.005)  .81  1,344  .455(.066)  .75  1,912  .483(.008)
Note:  Numbers  In parenthesis  are standard  deviations.
1  able 1 examines  regional  employment  and  regional  distributions  of hoirs of work for employed  rr ales  and
females  aged 15-702'. The  participation  rates  for males  and females  are considerably  higher  in rural  than in urban
areas. Rates  for married  females  are higher  than those  for unmarried  females,  perhaps due to an income  effect.
Females  In rural  areas  work consL.erably  longer  than  females  in urban  areas. Males  also  work longer  in rural  areas,
but the differencr is less significant.
The figures In table 1 may cover large Individual  differences  in hours of work.  We now employ the
A-coefficient  as a measure  of the relative  differences  in hours  of work (see  section  2.1); corresponding  results  based
on the Gini coefficient  are given In Appendix  1. The estimates  of the A-coefficient  are displayed  in table 1.
The inequaliy estimates  show large Individual  variations  in hours of work,  particularly  among females.
Except  for rural  women,  the inequality  in the distribution  of hours  of work is significantly  higher  than i the Individual
hours of work were generated  randomly,  I.e. trom a uniform  (O,a)  diLtribution  for an arbftrary  a.  There are not,
however,  significant  discrepancies  In inequality  between  the distribution  of hours  of work for married  and unmarried
females. Inequality  is lowest  in the rural area  for both males  and females.
2/  Individuals  are classified  as employed  i  they worked  one hour or more during  the seven  days or 12
months prior to the survey. The  definition  and measurement  of annual  hours of work are reported  in
Appendix  2.8 -
The observed  distribution  of hours  of work Is the resut of a process  where  the ir,dividuals  make  decisions
on hours  of work In each sector  simultaneously.  The  sectors  are  dafned as (1) wage  work, (2) nonagricultural  sel-
employment,  (3)  agricultural  self-employment,  and (4) unpaid  family  work. By decomposing  the overall  Inequalky  In
the dstrIbutlon  of hours  of work wih respect  to these  sectors,  we obtaln  information  about ths contribution  of each
sector  to the overall  Inequality. (it Is understood  that the behavioral  labor market  adjustments  are given).
By applying  the decompsition method  for the A-zoefficient,  we obtain  the results  In table  2.  For females
the first and third column (second  and fourth for males)  give  the relative  contribution  from each sectoi to overall
Inequality  and to total hours of work, respectively.  The  ffth and  sixth column  give  the Interaction  ;oefficients. The
positive  ir,  :atction  coefficlents  demonstrate  that  each  sector  has  a disequalizing  Influence  oii the distribution  of hours
of work h. each region. Note that the sectoral  contriiution  to overall  Inequality  for females  Is equal  to the prod-cts
of the figures In columns  three and five divided by 100. Consequently,  the sum of the first four sectoral  Inequality
contributions  fc: females  In table  2 Is equal  to the overall  inequalIty  (0.521)  in the distribution  of hours of work for
females  In Peru..9.-
Table  2. Decomposition  of the Ainequallty In Distributions  of Hours  of Work  for Females  and Males,  With Respect
to (1) Wage Work, (2) Nonagricultural  Sel-Employment,  (3) Agricultural  Self-Employment  and (4) Unpaid  Family
VWork,  by Region
Sectoral  fraction  Sectoral  ftractlon
Region  (level  of  of overall  lnequa.  of total hours of  Interaction
Inequality  for  Employment  litv (2ercent)  work (percent)  coefflcient
females  and malss)  sector
Female  Male  Fem-;a  Male  Female  Male
1  21.9  39.9  22.0  42.9  0.518  0.368
Peru  2  28.5  27.2  24.1  20.3  0.618  0.531
(0.521)  3  7.5  17.7  7.8  16.1  0.501  0.435
(0.396)  4  42.1  15.2  46.1  20.7  0.476  0.292
1  53.2  58.3  52.8  66.6  0.573  0.348
Uma  2+3  37.8  40.4  33.0  29.8  0.653  0.539
(0.569)  4  9.0  1.3  14.2  3.6  0.360  0.144
(0.398)
1  25.4  44.7  26.1  50.4  0.547  0.385
Other urban  2+3  53.8  50.7  45.8  39.4  0.661  0.558
(0.563)  4  20.8  4.6  28.1  10.2  0.417  0.195
(0.434)
1  8.6  26.8  7.5  24.4  0.536  0.403
Rural  2  13.1  8.3  11.2  6.8  0.543  0.451
(0.467)  3  13.2  35.2  13.6  31.9  0.455  0.409
(0.370)  4  65.1  29.7  67.7  36.9  0.449  0.298
Note:  Fraction  of overall  Inequality  =
Fraction  of total hours of work)  x (I:lteraction  coefficient)
Overall  inequalIty
Example:
Wage sectors fraction of overall  inequality  for females  in Peru
22.0 x 0.518
- ____  =  21.9
0.521
According  to table 2, wage work plays  a predominant  role for males  and females  In Uma and for males
In other urban  areas. In rural areas  males and females  work mainly  in the agricultural  sector, but the wage work
accounts  for almost  25 percent  of the total hours of work for rural men.
The large  Interaction  coefficients  In  table 2 suggest  that females  with long total hours work more hours In
each sector  than females  with short  total hours of work. To a certain  extent  thIs conclusion  Is also  valid  for males.
For males,  however,  there is a weak Interactin between  the hours worked  as an unpaid family worker and total
hours of work. Tnis means  that males  with short  total hours  of work do neai 1y as much unpaid  family  work as males
with long total hours of work. Note that  the sel-employment  sectors  have  the largest  Interaction  coefficients,  which- 10 -
implies  that  these  sectors  make  the largest  contributions  to the observed  differences  in hours  of work among  males
and females.
2.3.  Inequality  In distribution  of household  consumotion
This section deals  with measurements  of economic  inequality. Such studies  depend on the definition  of
Income,  the unit of observation,  the period of time over which the chosen Income  variable Is measured,  and a
summary  measure  of inequality.
We define  the basic  Income  variable  as consumption  defined  as: 31
consumption  =z wage eamings
+  z net entrepreneurial  Income
+  z other income.
In this definition  savings  are included  in consumption. Note that consumption  of home-grown  food and
other In-kind Income  Is given a monetary  value so that net entrepreneurial  Income  include  consumption  of these
iems. The basic unit of observation  is the household  and  the reference  period  is one year. The Z' in the definition
of consumption  means  sum over all persons  who lived In the household  during the year  in question.
As a supplement  to the Information  on individual  variations  in hours of work given in section  2.2 we give
estimates  of the A-coefficient  for the regional  distributions  of hours of work among  households:
Other
Peru  Uma  urban areas  Rural  areas
0.487  0.497  0.492  0.458
(0.004)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.006)
(Standard  deviations  In parenthesis)
The figures for Lima and other urban areas are approximately  equal  to the inequality  in a uniform  (O,a)
distribution. When  we plot the respective  underlying  inequality  curves,  however,  we find that households  In the lower
and upper  tails of the observed  distribution  have  longer  hours of work than  In the uniform  (O,a)  distribution. As for
the distribution  of hours of work among individuals  (see  table 1) the Inequality  in the corresponding  distribution
among households  is lowest  in rural areas.
In  spite of large  inequality  In  the household  distribution  of hours of work,  we cannot  automatically  ascertain
the immediate  implication  for the Inequality  In the corresponding  distribution  of household  consumption. The
distribution  of consumption  is the resuft  o' preferred  hours and offered  wages  and prices,  and will therefore  depend
3/  See appendix  2 for details.- 11  -
on  the  wage  rate, the  returns to  self-employment activities, the  hours  of  wage work  and  self-employment, and
nonlabor Income  as well  as the  Interdependence among these variables.  For example,  i  households  with high
retums to  self-employment activities work longer hours than households with low returns to their self-employment
activities, and if In additlon there exists a positive relationship between wage rates and the household's hours of work
in the wage sector, then we must expect more Inequality in consumption than In the distribution of hours of work.
Table 3 shows mean and median household consumption and inequality In the distribution of consumption
among  households.  Note that these estimates are based on fewer observations than the estimates used in tables
I  and 2 because we have excluded households with observed negative net entrepreneurial Income. The large figures
of the A-coefficient In table 3 reveal extreme Income inequality.  The mean consumption of the richest 5 percent of
the households is  128 times the mean consumption  of the poorest 50 percent of the households, and 1,355 times
the  mean consumption of the poorest  10 percent.
Table 3. Mean and Median DistributLIon  of  Household Consumption (in intis), and A-Inequality Among Households,
by Region
Other
Peru  Lima  urban areas  Rural areas
Number of observations  .....  4,622  1,287  1,316  2,019
Mean . ..............  42,500  40,120  71,104  25,373
(10,066)  (2,250)  (32,912)  (8,273)
Median  ................  11,433  22,344  15,660  4,423
A-inequality  ......  ......  0.864  0.680  0.892  0.895
(0.033)  (0.016)  (0.049)  (0.034)
Note:  In intis (Peruvian Currency) at june  1985 prices.  Standard deviations In parenthesis.. 12-
Table  4. Mean  Consumption  for Households  Uving  In Peru  by Deciles  Decomposed  with respect  to Females,  Males
and Chilcrens  Wage Eamings  and with respect  to the Households  Net  Entrepreneurial  Income  and Other Income
Decile  Decile
specific  specfic
Decile  specfic mean  mean net  mean of
Decile  Mean  wage eaminas  for  entrepreneurial  other
household  Females Males  Children  income  Income
consumption  (15-70)  (15-70)  (7-14)  for households
I  .................  397  13  40  2  324  18
2 .................  1,700  80  222  15  1,296  87
3 .................  3,443  192  793  27  2,268  163
4 .................  6,077  387  1,964  42  3,270  394
5 .................  9,478  884  3,634  29  4,203  718
6 .................  13,643  1,367  6,086  63  5,244  883
7 .................  19,082  1,741  8,220  35  7,630  1,456
8  .................  27,073  4,665  10,902  214  10,723  1,924
9 .................  41,140  4,718  15,592  53  16,970  3,807
10 .................  302,982  20,460  31,874  326  242,670  7,651
All  .................  42,500  3,315  7,948  85  29,461  1,691
Note: Intis at June 1985  prices.
The results  In  Table  3 show  that the Inequality  In the distribution  of consumption  Is considerably  higher  In
rural areas  than In Uma, even though hours of work were more equally distributed  In rural areas.  To obtain
Information  on why inequality  varies  across  distributions,  we will examine  the Impact  of different  income  sources  on
overall  Inequality.  By dacomposing  the inequaliy  in the actual  distribution  of consumption  by males,  females,  and
children's wage earnings, and by households'  net entrepreneurial  Income,  we may see why the consumption
distributions  differs  across  regions. By applying  the  decomposHion  method  for the A-coefficient,  we obtain  the results
In table 5.  The Interpretation  Is analogous  to the Interpretation  of table 2.  To give an Impression  of the variations
behind  the coefficients  for Peru In  table  5, table  4 displays  mean  household  consumption  by deciles,  corresponding
meani  earnings  for males,  females,  and children,  mean entrepreneurial  household  Income  and mean other  income
for each decile. Since the decile-specffc  mean wage earnings  for females  Increases  wHth  Increasing  deciles,  the
corresponding  Interaction  coefficient  takes a large  posHitve  value,  which  Is In accordance  wHh  the estimate  (0.842)
In table 5.  But If  the decile-specHfic  means  are equal,  then  the corresponding  Interaction  coefficient  would become
zero or approximately  zero.- 13 -
Table 5. Decompositlon  of the A-inequality  in the Dlstribution  of Consumption  by Males,  Females,  and Children's
Wage Income,  and by Net Entrepreneurial  Household  Income  Plus  Other Income,  by Region.
Fraction  of  Fraction  of
Region  Income  overall  In-  consump-
(Level  of  (consumption)  equality  tlon  Interaction
inequality)  factor  (percent)  (percent)  coefficient
Females  (15-70)  wage eamings  7.6  7.8  0.842
Males (15-70)  wage  eamings  . 16.0  18.7  0.742
PERU  (0.864)  Childrens  (7-14)  wage eamings  0.1  0.2  0.635
Households  net entrepreneurial
income  .72.7  69.3  0.906
Other Income  .3.6  4.0  0.767
Females  (15-70)  wage eamings . 18.5  17.0  0.741
Males  (15-70)  wage earnings . . 35.9  39.5  0.618
UMA (0.680)  Childrens  (7-14)  wage eamings  0  0.1  -0.076
Households  net entrepreneurial
income .38.2  34.9  0.744
Other income  .7.4  8.5  0.596
Females  (15-70)  wage earnings  . 5.1  5.6  0.805
OTHER  Males  (15-70)  wage earnings  8.1  11.5  0.629
URBAN  (0.892)  Childrens  (7-14)  wage eamings  0.1  0.1  0.741
Households  net entrepreneurial
Income  .84.8  80.2  0.943
Other Income  .1.9  2.6  0.665
Females  (15-70)  wage eamings . 2.2  2.4  0.829
Males  (15-70)  wage earnings . . 9.7  10.9  0.795
RURAL  (0.895)  Childrens  (7-14)  wage earnings  0.3  0.4  0.774
Households  net entrepreneurial
Income  .85.7  84.1  0.911
Other income  .2.1  2.2  0.866
Male  wage  eamings  in Uma provide  almost  40 percent  of household  consumption  which  is attained  at the
expense  of about 43 percent  of the households  total hours  of work In wage employment  by male members  of the
household. For females,  the corresponding  figure is about 17 percent,  whichi  reflects  17 percent  of the households
hours of work.  However,  despite  the fact that this particular  structure  In the distribution  of hours of work among
households  is maintained  in the distribution  of consumption  among  households,  consumption  Is cons'rderably  more
unequal  than hours of work.  The explanation  is that the Interaction  coefficlents  referring  to the consumption
distribution  for Uma,  given In table  5, are  considerably  larger  than the corresponding  interaction  coefficients  related
to the distribution  of hours of work reported  in Aaberge  and Dagsvik  (1990). This resuit  Is due to skew  distributed
wage rates  and a positive  correlation  between  wage rates  and hours of work.  By applying  a particular  non-linear
decomposifton  method  (not  reported  here)  we also  found that  the wage  rates  contributed  more  strongly  to Inequality
in the distribution  of household  consumption  than  hours  of work in the wage  sector. These  effects  are  stronger  for
females  than for males.- 14 -
Note that the Interaction  coefficient  for children's  wage earnings  in Lima  Is weakly  negative,  which moans
that children's  wage  earnings  have  a modest  equalizing  effect  on the distribution  of consumption  among  households.
This effect  Is In contrast  with the effect  of children's  wage work on the inequality  of tne corresponding  distribution
of hours of work and is mainly  due to nonworking  children  of rich households  with low or medium  total hours of
work.  In both cases the children's  contribution  to overall  inequality  is of minor importance,  as shown In the first
column  of table 5.
In contrast  to the results  for Lima,  wage eamings  in other urban  areas  yield a modest contribution  to total
household  consumption,  compared  to the contribution  of the household's  hours In wage work to the households
total hours of work.  The fractions  are, respectively,  17 and 40 percent.  For the same reason  as for Lima the
Interaction  coefficients  related  to the distribution  of consumption  are considerably  larger  than the corresponding
interaction  coefficients  for the distribution  of hours of work.  Similar  results  hold for the rural areas,  although  the
distribution  of household  consumption  seems  to a greater  extent  to reflect  the distribution  of household  hours of
work.
2.4.  Inequality  in Distributions  of Per-Capita  Household  Consumption
The information  in section 2.3 about the economic  structure of the labor market must be Interpreted
cautiously  when analyzing  welfare  because  of the variations  In household  composition  and size. To allow  for the
fact that some households  have  several  persons  while others  have just one, we need an aternative  to household
consumption  as an indicator  of welfare. Clearly,  an Index  of welfare  using the information  on household  size and
composition  is required. In the PLSS  data an equivalence  scale  accounts  for this heterogeneity.  Specifically,  the
costs of children  are specified  in terms  of fractions  of one aduft. The  weights  are  0.2 for a child under  7 years  old,
0.3 for a child aged  7 to 12,  0.5  for a child 13  to 17,  and 1  for a person  over 17. The  sum of these  weights  for each
household  is used as the scale.  Consumption  per capita is defined as household  consumption  relative  to the
equivalence  scale and it is used  as an indicator  of household  welfare. Note that these  weights  are  consistent  with
the weights estimated  for Sri Lanka  and Indonesia  by Deaton  and Mullbauer  (1986) and have been applied by
Glewwe  (1987X  in analyzing  the distribution  of welfare  in Peru In  1985.86.  Glewwe's  analysis  is based  on expenditure
data rather  than on income  data.
The lack of sufficient  data makes  it impossible  to distinguish  consumption  levels  among  members  of the
household.  Therefore  we have to assume that the welfare  level of an  individual  is equal to the  per capita
consumption  of the household. It is particularly  interesting  to examine  the relationship  between  the distribution  of
per capita household  consumption  among  households  and the distribution  of per capita household  consumption
among persons.Table 6 shows average  welfare  levels  for Lima, other urban areas,  and rural areas.  The figures show
considerable  differences  in welfare  between  adults and children,  and between  urban  and rural areas. The large
differences  between  corresponding  medians  and  means  indicate  extremely  skewed  distributions,  which  are  confirmed
by the estimates  of the A-coefficient  In table  7.
Table  7 shows  only insignificant  differences  In inequality  across  per capita  household  consumption  among
households  and persons.  This Is in line  with  the results  reported  by Berry  (1988). More  surprising  Is the finding  that
the inequality  in per-caplta  household  consumption  dfffers  little  from Inequality  in the corresponding  distribution  of
total household  consumption  (compare  tables  3 and 7). This result  is due to an extremely  unequal  distribution  of
consumption  (Income)  In Peru  In 1985-86.  Glewwe  (1987)  reports  that  this was also  the case in 1966,  when  the Gini-
coefficient  for per capita income inequality  among persons was 0.666. We estimate  the Gini-coefficient  of the
distribution  of per capita  household  consumption  among  persons  in 1985-86  to be 0.789  (see  Appendix  1,  table  G3).
Table 6. Mean  and Median  Per Capita  Consumption  Among Persons  by Sex, Age,  and Region
Other
Popula-  Peru  Lima  urban areas  Rural  areas
tion  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median
All  ...............  11,692  3,332  10,668  5,983  19,139  4,190  7,454  1,404
(24,126)  (6,541)  (6,952)  (10,633)
Females ...........  13,282  3,508  10,406  6,036  25,154  4,143  6,654  1,332
(7,376)  (2,256)  (2,185)  (2,935)
Malee .............  12,207  3,820  11,529  6,418  20,013  4,423  7,097  1,516
(7,004)  (2,090)  (2,054)  (2.860)
Children4' ..........  10,118  2,965  10,1V8  5,404  13,630  3,945  8,150  1,380
(9,746)  (2,195)  (2,713)  (4,838)
Note:  Intis  figures  at June 1985  prices. Number  of observations  in parenthesis.
41  Less than 15 years old.- 16 -
Table 7. A-inequality  In Distributions  of Per Capita  Consumption  Among  Households  and Persons,  by Region
Other urban
Peru  Lima  areas  Rural
Households ........  .857  .676  .881  .895
(.029)  (.017)  (.048)  (.032)
Persons  ..........  .856  .662  .883  .888
(.014)  (.008)  (.021)  (.016)
Note: Standard  deviations  in parenthesis.
3.  The Econometric  FramnwAork  of a Structural  Neoclassical  Model
3.1.  Theoretical  Model
This section focuses on the essential  features of our framework  and its relationship  to the traditlonal
approach  in the empirical  analyses  of labor  supply (see  Klilingsworth  1983). For the sake of simplicity  we take  tha
case of one individual. The  traditional  approach  starts  by postulating  a direct (or indirect)  utility  function In leisure
(nonmarket  activities)  and consumption  from which  the labor  supply  function is derived  by maximizing  utility  subject
to the budget  constraint. (Aiternatively,  the labor  supply function  is postulated  directly  so that it is consistent  with
a well-defined  utility  function). In this approach  it is assumed  that the Ir,dividual  Is free  to adjust  his or her hours
of work.  The notion  of rationing  with respect  to job offers or hours of work Is rarely  taken  into account. Another
feature  of most empirical  models  Is the assumption  of linear  labor  supplv curves. Linear  supply  functions  imply a
particular  and quite restrictive  form of the utlity function  that seems  unjustified  a priori. For example  it Implies  that
the 'backward  bending  case is excluded  a priorl.
The altemative  empirical  approach  we use here is consistent  with neoclassical  theory but it departs  from
the econometric  specifications  used by others. We assume  that the essential  choice variable  is Job or  positionr
and that hours of work and wage ratas  are determined  once the position is given. By positon we understand  a
particular  combination of market  and nonmarket  activities. For example,  one position  may be defined  as specific
farmwork  tasks combined  with a particular  wage work job.  Thus  hours of work and wage rates  are attributes  that
characterize  the positions. Let (Hj, W)  be the hour-wage  combination  of position. Here  j Is an Indexation  of the
positon.  For nonmarket  postlions,  Wi=0.  The  choice set Is assumed  known  to the individual  but Is unobserved
by the econometrician.  Onty  the hours  of work and wage rates  are observed. That Is, the hour-wage  combination
associated  with the chosen  positon is observed.- 17 -
To make  the exposition  as simple  as possible,  we assume  that  the set of feasible  positlons,  B, (choice  set)
is finite (relative  to the individual.  The individual's  maximization  problem  can be described  as follows. The  budget
constralnts  are given by
(3.1)  h = Hi
(3.2)  C =  HiWi  + I
(3.3)  j * B
where  I Is nonlabor  Income. Equation  (3.1)  states  that  for a given posifton  J,  hours of work are given. The  third
equation  states  that B is the set of feasible  positions. Equation  (3.2)  is the standard  economic  budget  constraint.
Let
U(h,C,j  =  v(h,C) + ei
be the individual's  utility of hours of work, h, consumption,  C, and position,  j.  We assume  that this utility can be
decomposed  in a structural  term,  v(h,C), (common  to observationally  Identical  Individuals)  and a random  term, ej,
that reflects  individual  preferences  for positions  wnh  the same  level  of hours  and consumption. Thus  ej takes into
account heterogeneity  In tastes  across  Individuals  with respect  to posiions as well  as the unobserved  attributes  of
the positions.
The random  term e  is assumed  independent  of the choice set of feasible  positions.  Thus our approach
Is In fact a type of disequilibrium  model In which the choice opportunities  are considered  fixed.  The Individual's
problem Is to find the position  j i  B that maximizes
v(Hj,  HjW  +I)  +  e.l
Now let B(h,w)  be the set of positions  for which Hi=h,  W =w. JeB  and let n(h,w) be the number  of positions  in
B(h,w).
Formally,  the probability  that the optimal  position  has hour-wage  combination  (h,w)  Is expressed  as
o(h,w) =  P (  max  (v(Hj,HjWj+l)+ee)  =  max(v(Hj,HjW,+I)  + e)  }.
Moreover,  if we assume  that the random preference  terms ei  are independent,  extreme  value distrlbuted  across
positions,  we get Immediately  from the formal theory of discrete  choice as developed  by McFadden  (1973)  (see
Maddala,  1983)  that
n(h,w)exp(v(h,hw-  1))





g(h,w) =  -
z  n(x,y)
x,y18 -
be the fraction  of positions  with hours and wages  equal  to (h,w)  that are feasible. By inserting  In (3.4)  we get
g(h,w)exp(v(h,hw+  I))
(3.5)  *(h,w)  =
z  g(x,y)exp(v(x,xy+l))
x,y
This model  is analogous  to the one developed  by Ben-Akiva  et al. (1985). The  function * expresses  the
labor supply density. Its observable  counterpart  is the fraction of individuals  who work h hours at wage rate  w.
Instead  of the usual specifications  where  the labor supply  density  Is expressed  as a function of the parameters  of
the labor supply function we realize from  (3.5)  that In our model  the density Is expressed  as a function of the
structural  part of the utility  function.
Moreover,  this model  allows  the notion  of rationing.  SpecIfically,  (3.5)  expresses  the aggregate  labor  supply
as a simple  function of the mean  utility,  v, and the opportunity  density,  g(h,w).
Let us consider  a particular  extension  to the case  where  the individual  has  the choice of participating  in two
sectors - wage work and informal self-employment. In this case the set  of feasible positions consists of
combinations  of market  activities  and type of production. Thus a specific  position  defines  the type of wage  work,
type of production,  and so on.  To a position  j there correspond  attributes
(H J. H;,  WJ, Tj 
_  *
where  H  and H  J  are hours of work in wage work and self-employment,  W3 is the wage rate, Ti  is a variable
characterizing  technology  (unobservable)  associated  with position  j.
Now the budget  constraints  take the form
(3.6)  C  =  Ha Wj  + Yi  + I
(3.7)  YJ  =  F(Hj)Tj
where F (H j)  Tj  is a profit  function conditional  on hours and Yj  is the profi. (For analytical  convenience  we
assume  the structure  to be of the multiplicative  form.)
The  essential  postulate  that  ensures  identification  is  that  the opportunity  density  with respect  to offered  hours
is assumed  to be uniform.  We assume  no constraints  on hours of work (given  that work in the respective  sectors
is available). The  offered distribution  of wages  across positions  (conditional  on education)  is assumed  to be log
normal  with mean dependent  on experience  and level  of schooling  (splines). The opportunity  density  of the profit
(conditional  on hours)  is assumed  log normal  with mean  that is log linear  with an interaction  term in hours. Unlike
Jacoby (1988)  our approach  accounts  for possible  simuttaneous  equation  bias, and does not distinguish  between- 19  -
output  from agricultural  and nonagricultural  self-employment.  In  the actual  empirical  application  below  a continuous
analogue  to the discrete  model above  has been  estimated. For details  we refer  io Dagsvik  and Aaberge  (1989).
3.2.  Model  specification
The preferences  are  represented  in the model  by a Box-Cox  type utility  function  that is additively  separable
In consumptlon  and in each  of the individual's  leisure.  The  leisure  torms  are  p,.rameterized  as a function  of age and
for females  we hav, added  the number  of children  below six yea,-s  of age In interaction  with hours of work In the
wage sector. Thus  tne systematic  term,  v, of the utility  function Is assumed  to have  the form:
((1  +  C  )1  .1)
(3.8)  V(q., 17F'  C,f  _____2_low
a1
+  E  (a4  +  as log Ajm +  a 6 (iog  AJM) 2)  -1
j3
+  Z  (as  +  @tg  log  AF  +  a10(log  AJF)
2)
J  a7
+  all  z  h  fJ  +  E12  E  D3M
i  i  12  j
where  Ljr  is defined  by
L3r  = 1  Jr,  r =  F,M
8760
C  = per capita  household  consumption,
fi  =  number  of children  less than six years,
Ajr  = age of household  member  j, gender  r =  F,M,
hjr  = total annual hours of work for household  member  j, gender r
h JF  = annual  hours of wage work, female  J,
and
r '  i  male  j has hours of work in (2475,  2525)
I °  otherwise.
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Except  fOr  the  term  1  3S  h JF fj,  utility is assumed  additively  separable  In consumption  and leisure.
Note  that apart  from the peak  at full-time  (2475,2525)  the utility  of consumption  Is concave  and Increasing  when  a,
<  1,  *3  C  11  a7  <  1  1
4  +  a 5 logAJH +  a 6(  logAm  )2  >  0
and
a8  +  aglogAjF  +  alo  (lOgAjr  )2  >  0.
The  dummy  varlable,  D M. allows  males  to have  a particular  preference  for total hours of work In the interval  (2575,
2525). The  motivation  for introducing  this dummy  is that the data  shows a marked  concentration  of hours in this
interval  both for males  that are engaged  In  wage work as well as In  farm and nonfarm  self-employment.  This can
only cccur
(1)  If males have  a particular  preference  for full-time  work,
(2)  If there  are constraints  on hours (there  are more  full-time  work positions  relative  to other positions),
(3)  if ths data are corrupted  by measurement  errors.
The  estimated  model  is consistent  with all these  explanations  but we are  not able to identify  which  is the
true one.
The conditional  profit  function  for the rural area given Inputs  is specified  as21
(3.9)  log  Y  =0  +  1310g(l+hm)  +  32109g(1+hF)  +  83 3109(1+h,)
+  B4Iog(1  +h,)iog(1  +ht)  +  B13 5og(1 +TOTWET)
+  B61og(1+TOTDRIED)  +  B7MAXED  + T
where
Y  =  profit  of household  from self-employment  (both farm and nonfarm)
h*  =  total male hours of work in self-employment
hF  =  total female  hours of work  in  seHf-employment
he  =  total child hours of work in self-employment
TOTWET  =  total area of watered  land
TOTDRIED =  total area of dry land
MAXED  =  length  of schooling  of most  educated  member  of the household
T  =  rancom  error term - normally  distributed.
T  Is supposed  to account for unobserved  choice variables  that affect the production  technology. The
distribution  of the technology  attribute,  T, is assumed  to be normal N(O,t),  and it Is assumed  to be independent  of
other Input  factors. Note  that the land  variables  appear  only in agricultural  production,  not in nonfarm  production.
The conditlonal  profit  function for Uma Is specified  as
(3.10)  logY  =  +  ,log(l +hM)  +  02 109(l+hF)
+  P 3log(l+hM)  log (1+hF) +  014  MAXED  + T,
Let g.  be the fraction of all self-employment  positions  that are feasible  for the household.  Let g9 be the
fraction  of feasibe positions  for an individual  of sex r, r=F,M, that are nonfarm  self-employment  positions. Let g  r
and 9r  be defined  analogously  as the corresponding  opportunity  probabiiitles  for farm self-employment  and wage
work, respectively.
We have parameterized  g,  as
B
(3.11)  1  -gy  =  - .
a+8(1-a)
where
B  =  [(-9  r )(1-g  r  AMr r=F,M. 22  -
and mF,  mm  are the numbers  of females  and males  In  the household  and I >  a > 0 Is a parameter.  The case a=1
corresponds  to the case  In which  all self-emp!oyment  opportunity  sets  are Independent  across  household  members.
The  particular  parametrization  (3.11)  has been  cr,osen  for computational  convenience. Finally,  we have  Introduced
g, which  Is the fraction of feasible  self-employment  positions  that yields positive  profit  during a period (one year).
The rationale  behind  g9 is that In addition  to a llmited  set of feasible  self-employment  positions  Is the fact that a
successful  businesa  does not necessarily  yield positive  profRt  through every  period. In fact the data demonstrates
that profit  is negative  for some households  during  the period  of the data  collection. We may interpret  alternatively
as the (average)  traction  of the year  the business  Is likely  to operate  wnh  positive  profit. A rigorous  treatment  of the
choice of self-employment  activity  would of course  require  a model  for decision  under uncertainty.
The  offered  wage densities  are  assumed  log normal  where  the means  depend  on experience,  SPLYRSC1,
SPLYRSC2,  SPLYRSC3  where  experience  Is defined  as age minus length  of schooling  minus  6 and
r  (X,O,O) if  x t 5
(SPLYRSC1,  SPLYRSC2,  SPLYRSC3)  =  . (5,x-5,0) if  5  < x 5  10 ! (5,5,x-10)  if  x >  10.
L
4.  Summar statcs  and p  eter  esimates
The summary  statistics  of the variables  generated  from the household  survey  data are presented  in Table
8 for Lima  and rural  areas. There  are  differences  In observed  household  behavior  In  production  and consumption,
and in inovidual and household  attributes. For example,  consumption  (income)  per capita  is much  higher In Uma
than in rural areas. Women  in Uma spend more hours In wage work than  women in rural  areas;  women  In rural
areas  spend  more hours  in self-employment.  However  rural  households  record  higher  profits  from seit-employment
than do  households  In Uma.  This is not surprising  given that nontarrn  production  is dominant in Uma while
agricultural  production  is the leading  activity  in the self-employment  category. Interestingly,  female  wage workers
earn more In rura:  areas  than male  wage  workers.  For more  details  see section  2 and  Aaberge  and Dagsvik  (1990).
The parameters  of the opportunity  density  and of the utility  function are estimated  simultaneously  by a
modified  maximum  likelihood  procedure. The estimates  of the utility  function are presented  in Table 9, while the
estimates  of the opportunity  density  are  given  in Table  12. The  estimates  of  the wage  and profit  functions  are  shown
in Tables 10 and 11 respectively.  We have also  estimated  the wage equations  and the profit  function by ordinary
least  squares. This procedure  may lead to biased  estimates  since  it does not account for the fact that households
do not maximize  profit but the utility of consumption  and leisure.  Consequently,  the conditional  expectation  of the
error  term in the profit  firnction given  the hours  is in general  a function  of these  hours because  they enter  the utility
function  through consumption  and leisure. The results  are reported  here only for Lima and rural areas.-23 -
Table 8. Household  and Individual  Sample  Statistics
Lima, Mean  Rural  Areas,  Mean
Variables  (Standard  (Standard
devlation)  deviation)
Household  Statistics
Number  of households  898
Consumption  per capita (intis) .....  ..........  6,900  (150)  2578  (86)
Female  hours of work in wage work (yearly)  .....  832  (44)  101  (13)
Female  hours of work In self-employment  (yearly)  638  (44)  2232  (49)
Male  hours of work in wage work (yea ,)  .......  2.171  (61)  594  (29)
Male hours of work in self-employrnent  (yearly) . ..  907  (50)  2724  (51)
Childrens  hours of work In self-employment  (yearly)  53  (10)  4  (0.1)
Total  gross revenue  from self-employment  (Intis)  . . 10,700  (600)  9056  (385)
Total  profit  from self-employment  (Intis)  ....  .....  6,300  (400)  7183  (311)
Number  of children  below 7  .....  ...........  0.84  (0.03)  1.34  (0.03)
Number  of children  below 14  .....  ..........  1.08  (0.04)  1.39  (0.03)
Number  of females  1S-70 ....  . ............  1.79  (0.04)  1.f2 9O.02)
Number  of people above  70  .....  ...........  0.09  (0.01)  0.08  (0.01)
Equivalence  scale .......  ................  4  (0.10)  3.7  (0.04)
Individual  Statistics
Number  of females  15-70,  1,611
Number  of males 15-70,  1.539
Participation  rates  in
wage work for females ......  .............  0.32  (0.01)  0.07  (0.01)
self-employment  for females  .....  ...........  0.35  (0.01)  0.85  (0.01)
wage work for males  ......  ..............  0.63  (0.01)  0.34  (0.01)
self-employment  for males .....  ............  0.35  (0.01)  0.89  (0.01)
Hours  of work in
wage work for females  (yearly)  .....  .........  463  (21)  67  (7
seHf-employment  for  females  (yearly) ....  ......  356  (20)  1477  (25)
wage work for males  (yearly) .....  ..........  1,267  (32)  387  (17)
self-employment  for males (yearly) ....  .......  529  (27)  1777  (25)
Wage rate,  females (intis per day) ....  .........  5.25  (0.40)  7.38  (2.45)
Wage rate, males (intis per day)  ..............  6.41  (0.20)  2.98  (0-30)- 24 -
Table  9. Parametqr  Estimates  for the Utilty  Function
Lima  Rural  Areas
Variables  Coefficients  Estimates  Estimates
(t.values)  (t-values)
r  1  -0.776  -12.941
I  (7.9)  (4.0)
Consumption  ......... 
1  *2  4.832  35.891
L  (7.3)  (2.0)
r  3  -3.605  -7.680
I  (9.5)  (14.9)
I  4  43.258  3.189
I  (5.4)  (3.3)
Leisure,  males .....  ..  i
1  5  -23.194  -1.704
I  (5.3)  (3.3)
I  a6  3.134  0.231
L  (4.1)  (3.3)
r  a7  -1.454  -5.380
I  (5.7)  (12.6)
I  aa  86.655  5.057
I  (5.5)  (2.8)
Leisure,  females  ....... 
a9  46.354  -2.475
I  (5.3)  (2.5)
a  @10  6.369  0.320
L  (3.2)  (2.3)
10-3  zfi  .f~  @  oi  -0.149  -0.152
(2.3)  (2.2)
z DjM .......  ...  a12  2.234  2.231
(18.8)  (19.7)
Note: t-values  in parenthesis.-25  -
Table 10.  Wage Equations  for LUma.  Simultaneous  ML Estimation  Procedure  Versus  Ordinary  Least  Squares
LIMA  RURAL  AREAS
Males  Females  Males  Females
Simul-  Simul-  Simul-  Simul-
OLS  taneous  ML  OLS  taneous  ML  OLS  taneous  ML  OLS  taneous  ML
Intercept  0.049  -0.105  -0.596  *0.674  0.352  0.395  0.473  0.451
(0.4)  (0.8)  (3.5)  (3.8)  (6.2)  (5.4)  (4.0)  (3.2)
SPLYRSC1+  0.092  0.100  0.126  0.125  0.040  0.034
SPLYRSC2  (8.4)  (8.2)  (8.2)  (7.9)  (3.5)  (2.3)
SPLYRSC3  0.117  0.136  0.126  0.150  0.284  0.306  0.303  0.540
(10.1)  (9-9)  (6.2)  (6.5)  (6.1)  (4.8)  (3.0)  (3.4)
Experience  0.050  0.038  0.056  0.050
(~ 3)  (5.7)  (5.7)  (5.0)
(Experience) 2/100  -0.060  -0.039  -0.073  -0.063
(5.3)  (3.1)  (3.5)  (3.1)
Standard  error  0.659  0.660  0.780  0.753  0.888  0.933  1.856  1.316
(40.4)  (32.9)  (34.4)  (17.7)
R2 0.27  0.25  0.09  0.06
Note:  t-values  In parenthesis.
Table 11. Parameter  Estimates  of the Conditional  Profit  Function
LIMA  RURAL  AREAS
Simultaneous  Simultaneous
Variable  OLS  ML estimate  OLS  ML estimate
Intercept ...........  2.681  (5.9)  3.078  (7.1)  4.246  (7.1)  2.181  (2.5)
Male labor ..........  0.756  (13.3)  0.572  (10.5)  0.329  (4.3)  0.543  (4.9)
Female  labor ........  0.756  (11.0)  0.487  (8.7)  0.222  (2.7)  0.393  (3.4)
Interaction,  female-male
labor  ..............  -0.085  (9.8)  -0.061  (7.6)  -0.031  (3.0)  -0.063  (3.5)
Child labor  -0.0004  (0.4)  -0.010  (0.7)
Watered  land  0.419  (7.5)  0.443  (5.2)
Dry land  0.264  (7.6)  0.249  (4.8)
Maxed  ............  0.047  (2.4)  0.072  (4.0)  0.578  (9.7)  0.734  (7.3)
Standttrd  error  .......  1.356  1.257  (31.9)  1.303  1.445  (31.3)
R2  .................  0.33  0.18
Note: t-values  in parenthesis.-26  -
Table 12. Estimates  of the Opportunity  Probabilities
Opportunity
Probability
SECTOR  Function  UMA  RURAL  AREAS
**
Agricuttural  sel-employment  g 1M
males  ......... l......  og  _  **  -2.804  1.932
1-g  1M  (19.3)(24.0)
Nonagricuitural  self-employment  91M
males  ...............  log  - *  -0.197  -1.501  + 0.027S
1-9  1M  (2.5)  (13.0)  (1.5)
Wage  work, males  .......  log  - -0.488  + 0.103S  -0.545  + 0.042S
1  1M  (2.6)  (5.4)  (5.5)  (1-9)
Agricultural  self-employment,  i  9  F  -1.198  1.656
females  ..............  log  -*  (12.5)  (24.0)
1-9 IF
Nonagricultural  self-employment  91F  0.007  -0.516
females ..............  log  - (0-1)  (9.4)
- -91F
9 1F  -1.236  + 0.152S  -2.656  +  0.162S Wage work, females ......  log  - (7-0)  (8-1)  (15.2)  (4.7)
1 - 1 F
Household  profit  from
self-employment ........  a  -0.577
(8.0)
93  1.884
Positive  profit from  log  (12.2)
self-employment  1-g,
S = Length  of schooling.
Note: t-values  in parenthesis.27 -
The  estimates  of Table 9 Imply  that the systematic  term (3.8)  of the utility  function Is strictly  concave  and
Increasing  In consumption  and leisure. The  estimates  also  show  that the utility  of leisure  is U-shaped  as a function
of age  with a minimum  at 40.6  years  for males  and  37.4  for females  In Lima. In rural  areas  the corresponding  ages
are 40.3  and 47.8. Moreover,  the Impact  of small  children  seems  to be the same in Lima as In rural areas.
The functional  form (3.8) implies  that the corresponding  labor supply  functlons are highly non-linear  and
cannot be expressed  In closed form.  As a consequence  the parameters  of Table 9 do  not have a simple
interpretation  In  terms of elasticities.  Table  10 shows  that education  and experience  are  very important  determinants
for the wage rate in the wage work sector  of Lima.  It also shows  that the selectivity  bias is negligible  for Uma but
for rural  areas OLS  seems  to underestimate  the effect  of education  for females.  The bias  is however  not significantly
different  from zero. Due  to few observations  experience  has been  excluded  from the wage equations  for the rural
areas. In addition  SPLYRSC1  and SPLYRSC2  have been  excluded  for females  in rural areas  for the same  reason.
The  justification  for Imposing  the same  coefficient  of SPLYRSC1  as of SPLYRDSC2  is that preliminary  estimation  runs
produced  estimates  that were quite close.  For the rural  areas the model  is estimated  conditional  on farms with
positive  proft from self-employment.  The reason  for this is that there  are few obse.vations  with zero or negative
profit  for households  with self-employment  activity. More  important,  preliminary  estimation  resufts  suggest  that the
type of farms with reported  zero or negative  self-employment  are essentially  different  from the rest of the sample.
Although  the difference  between  the OLS and  the ML estimates  in Table 11 is not statistically  significant  the
results  seem  to Indicate  that in the rural areas  OLS seems  to underestimate  the Impact  of male  and female labor,
and the education  variable  MAXED  (the  length  of schooling  of the highest  educated  member  of the family). In  Uma
OLS seems  to underestimate  the Impact  of male  and female  labor and overestimate  the Impact  of MAXED.  Recall
that the OLS  estimates  may be biased  (i.e.,  simultaneous  equation  bias)  while  the ML estimates  are obtained  by a
procedure  that take into account  that the input  factors are endogenous.
The profit-function  estimates  also  Impty  that the Cobb-Douglas  structure  Is rejected  since  there  Is a strong
negative  Interaction  between  male and female  hours of work. In contrast  to the result  for the rural areas  MAXED
seems  to be of little importance  for the level  of the profit  I  - Lima  Thus  the return  to education  in self-employment
Is much higher in rural areas  (0.7)  than In Uma (0.1).  The est.mates  of the opportunity  probabilities  in Table 12
show that length  of schooling  has a substantial  effect  on the opportunities  for wage work, particularly  for females
in Lima and In rural areas.  Recall  that the parameter  a accounts  for possible dependence  In self-employment
opportunities  across  family members  where  a = I corresponds  to independence.  Since a is estimated  to be 0.577,
Independence  Is ruled  out. The last  line of Table 12 Implies  that g, is estimated  to be 0.87. Thus,  on average,  the
seif-employment  businesses  in Lima  will produce  posiiive  prorit  a fraction  of 0.87  per  year  (given  that labor  Input  take
place).-28 -
5.  Poiy  Simlatin  Resunts  for LUma
Using  the econometric  framework  above  we can perform  complex  simulation  experiments  that take Into
account  the household  budget  constraint,  differences  In age,  schooling,  and household  size and compositlon. In
addition  we are able to account for unobserved  heterogeneity,  represented  in the model by random  error terms
associated  with the wage,  conditlonal  profit, and utility  functilon. After  the model  has been  estimated  it is possible
to perform  simulations  since  we then 'know  the parameters  of the structural  part of the utility,  the wage, and the
proft function,  and the probability  distributions  of the related  random  terms.
in practical policy simulation  experiments  we proceed as follows. For each household the respective
random  terms are drawn  from the corresponding  probability  distributions. The maximizatlon  of the utility  function
Is a pure  numerical  problem  given  the observed  household  characteristics.  The  resuhting  hours  that maximize  utility
are  the female  and male  labor  supply  In  each  sector. This procedure  Is performed  for each  household  In  the sample
to obtain  participation  rates,  distribution  of labor  In  each  sector,  and consumption  and profits  from self-employment.
Note that this procedure  implies  exact aggregation. Unfortunately,  since the model Is so rich it Is quite costly to
perform  precise  simulations.  We have  therefore  only  carried  out approximate  simulations  In  which the approximation
error Is of moderate  size.  Figures  1-6 In Appendix  3 show  the observed  and simulated  distribution  of male and
female hours of work and per capita consumption. These figures demonstrate  that the model Is capable of
reproducing  the survey  data  fairly well.
We confine  the analysis  to households  with at least one female and one male aduit, where per capita
household  consumptlon  does not exceed  20,000  Intis. Note that this selectlon  was not made In Section  2.
The  simulation  experiments  relate  to the effect  of changes  In wages  and education  on labor  supply,  wage
earnings,  profit  from self-employment,  and distribution  of economic  welfare.
5.1.  Wage  effects
Table 13 reports  the effect  of wage changes  on participation  probabilitles  and on mean hours worked  In
each sector. The  table shows  that a 20 percent  Increase  has only a small  effect  on labor supply. For the females,
mean  hours of work and participation  In the wage sector  Increase  by 5.8 and 3.2 percent  respectively.  The  effect
on mean  hours  and participation  In self-employment  Is almost  negligible.  The  cross effect  on male  participation  rates
and mean hours of work In each sector  is negligible.
Recall  that the sum of the participation  rates  across sectors may be greater  than one because many
Individuals  work In both  sectors. When  male  wages  are  Increased  by 20 percent,  their participation  and mean  hours
of work in the wage sector Increase  by 1.6 and 2.7 percent,  respectively. In the self-employment  sector, male-29 -
partcipatIon  and mean hours of work fall by 1.2 and 2 percent  respeclvely,  while female participation  and mean
hours  of work fall by 2 and  2.4 percent The  drop In female  labor  supply  reflects  the Income  effect  that  stems  from
the Increase  In mate  wages. When both male  and female  wages  Increase  by 20 percent,  the Impact  Is similar  but
weaker.
The largest  effect Is obtained  when the female wages go up  by 20 percent  of the mean wage. Then
paricipation and mean  hours In wage  work rlse 3.8 and 8 percent,  respectively.  Table 13 shows  that mean  hours
In the wage sector  Increase  by 4 percent The drop In participation  and mean hours recorded  In sel-employment
sector, however,  ls small. So Is also the change  In male labor  supply.- 30 -
Table 13. Changes  in Participation  Rates,  Annual  Hours  of Work, Earnings,  and Consumption  as a Result  of Wage
Increments  (Percentage  Changes  From Base  Case)
Sector  spe-
cific an-  Wage
Sector  specific  nual hours  earnings  Wage  Consump-
participation  of work (un-  (uncondi-  earnings  tion
conditio-  tiona)  (intis)  (intis)
Percentage  increase  naD*)  (intis)
Wage work SeHfemploy- Wage work Selfemp,oy-
ment  ment
F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M
Base  case .......... 0.32  0.62  0.34  0.35  414  1165  414  492  2300 8100  17900 27800
20 percent  Increase
In female  wages  .3.2  -0.6  -0.9  -1.2  5.8  -0.7  -0.5  -0.4  30.0  -1.2  6.3  5.0
20 percent  increase
In males  wages  -1.9  1.6  -2.0  -1.2  -2.2  2.7  -2.4  -2.0  -4.6  22.3  17.1  11.9
20 percent  increase  in both
females  and males  wages  0.6  0.6  -1.8  -1.4  1.9  1.9  -1.5  -2.4  19.8  20.5  21.2  11.5
Female  wage rates  increased
by 20 percent  of the
mean wage  . ......... 8.8  -1.4  -0.9  0  8.0  -1.4  -1.5  0  25.0  -0.8  5.0  4.7
Male  wage rates  Increased
by 20 percent  of the
mean wage  . ......... 9.9 2.1  -0.9  -2.3  -3.6  3.8  -0.5  -3.5  -4.5  17.6  14.0  7.0
Female  and male  wage rates
increased  by 20 percent  of
the mean wage  1.6.......  1.0  -2.3  -2.9  3.4  2.0  -2.7  -4.3  19.7  15.1  16.2  8.6
*)  Recall  that conditional  hours in the respective  sectors  can be obtained  by dividing the unconditional  hours by
the corresponding  participation  rates.
Table 14. Changes in Mean Level  and Inequality  in the Distribution  of Per Capita Household  Consumption  as a
Result  of Wage Increments  (percentage  change)
Mean  level  A-coefficient  Gini-coefficient
Base case .........  .............  7,600  (in intis)  0.566  0.438
20 percent  increase  in female  wages  ....  5.3  2.1  3.2
20 percent  increase  in male  wages  .....  11.9  0.6  0.7
20 percent  Increase  in both female  and
male  wages .........  ............  11.6  -1.3  -1.6
Female  wage rates  increased  by 20
percent  of the mean  wage .....  ......  4.9  0  0.7
Male  wage rates  Increased  by 20 percent
of the mean wage ......  ...........  6.4  -3.0  -3.4
Male  and female  wage rates  Increased
by 20 percent  of the mean wage  ......  8.6  -3.0  -3.4- 31 -
When males wages increase by 20 percent of the mean level, their participation and hours of work In the
wage sector increase by 2.1 and 3.8 percent respectively. In the sel-employment  sector, their participation and mean
hours decrease 2.3 and 3.5 percent.  The corresponding  Income effect implies that female participation and mean
hours  in the  wage sector  decrease 2.9  and 3.6 percent respectively, while there is  almost no  change  in female
participation and mean hours In the self-employment sector.
Table 14 demonstrates that wage changes have a modest effect on inequality In the distribution of per capia
consumption  among households.  A 20 percent Increase has very little distributional Impact, reducing Inequality by
3  percent  (A-coefficient).  This  reduction  corresponds  to  Introducing  a  proportional  tax of  3 percent  and  then
Increasing each household's per capita consumption by an equal share of the total tax revenue.  In other words the
transfer to  each household  is equal to  3 percent of  the mean consumption  per capita (before taxes).  A similar
increase In female wages increases the mean level of the household's per capita consumption by 4.9 percent, while
the  level  of  inequality  is  not  influenced.  This  result corresponds  to  Increasing each  household's  per capita
consumption by 4.9 percent.  Note that the relative changes in inequality are larger when inequality is measured by
the Gini coefficient than  by the A coefficient, particularly when female wages are increased by  20 percent.  This
means that the  central  part of  the  distribution  of  per capita consumption  Is more  strongly  Influenced  by  wage
changes than the lower part of the distribution.
Note that we  only repon aggregate effects here.  We have also done wage change simulations for  a two-
person  family  for  the  particular case  in which  all the  random  terms  are equal to  zero  and wihout  any  choice
constraints.  The results are not  reported here. (See Dagsvik  and Aaberge, 1989).  These simulations demonstrate
that the  elasticities of  hours are highly dependent on the level of the wage rates.  The reason the corresponding
aggregate effects are much smaller may be due to the large heterogeneity In wage rates and the fact that In many
families one or several persons are 'stuck,  in corner solutions, that is, they participate at most In one sector. Such
families are therefore less responsive to wage changes than families where all members work  in both sectors.  In
addition, restrictions on opportunities  prompt a large number of corner solutions.-32 -
5.2.  Education  effects
Table 15 shows  the impact  of education  through  the opportunity  probabilHies.  Here  the wage rates  and the
education  variable (MAXED)  in the conditional  profit function are kept unchanged. Thus we study the pure
*opportunity  effect. Contrary  to the wage simulations  above,  e obtain  a large  effect  from Increased  education.
If female  education  Is Increased  by one year,  female  participation  in the wage  sector  Increases  by 9.2 percent.  The
change  In  the participatlon  rate  in self-employment,  however,  Is wlthin  the simulatlon  error margin. If male  education
is Increased  by one year,  participation  In  wage  work Increases  by 3.4 percent,  and remains  unchanged  for the self-
employed. If the minimum  education  for females  Is Increased  to nine  years,  female  participation  in the wage  sector
Increases  by 19 percent. When males'  level  of schooling  is Increased  analogously,  male  participatlon  In the wage
sector  Increases  by 3.9 percent. The  cross effects  appear  to be negligible.
Table 15.  Effects  of Education  on Sector-Specific  Participation  Rates  When  Wages  Are Fixed
(percentage  change)
Sector-soecific  particiDation  rates
Wace  work  Self emplovment
F  M  F  M
Base case ..........  ..............  0.32  0.62  0.34  0.35
One year of additional  schooling
for females  .........  ..............  9.2  -1.4  0  0
One year of additional  schooling
for males ...........  ..............  .1.3  3.4  0  -0.6
One year of additional  schooling
for both males  and females .....  .......  7.6  2.4  0  -0.9
Nine years  of schooling  as a lower
limit for females .......  .............  19.0  -1.0  0  -0.3
Nine years  of schooling  as a lower
limit for males  ........  .............  -1.3  3.9  0  -0.9
Nine years  of schooling  as a lower
limit for both males  and females ....  .....  18.0  3.5  0  -1.2-33  -
Table 16 reports  the impact  of increased  educatlon  on labor  supply.  Here  only MAXED  Is kept unchanged.
In other words the increase  In schooling  affects  both wages and the choice set of work posiions.  The first line
demonstrates  that the wage effect  seenis  to be small  compared  to the Impact  through the opportunity  probabilItles.
In Table 15 we found that the corresponding  female  participation  rate  Increased  18 percent,  or only  3.5 percentage
points less than we obtained  by Increasing  minimum  schooling  to nine years  without  keeping  the wage rate  fixed.
The  subsequent  effect  on mean  hours of work In the wage sector  is a 25.6 percent  increase  for females  and a 2.7
percent  decrease  for males. The  corresponding  Increase  In the conditional  mean  hours given participation  In the
wage work sector  for females  Is 3.3 percent  The  other Income  and cross effects  on hours are small. The mean
wage earnings  for females  Increases  dramatically  to 42.6 percent.
If the minimun  i level of schooling  for males  Is increased  to nine years  the Impact  on labor  supply Is much
less. In this case participation  In wage work rises 5.6 percent  for males  and falls 3.5 percent  for females. Mean
hours of wage work increase  6.7 percent  for males  and decline  4.4 percent  for females. Other income  and cross
effects  on labor  supply  are  small. Wages  Increase  by 14.8  percent  for males  and  fall by 5 percent  for females. But
the total effect  on household  Income  is larger  than it was when  the minimum  education  for females  was raised  to
nine years.
When both males  and females  have  at least nine  years  of education,  female  participation  and mean hours
In wage work Increase  by almost  the same amount  as In the  marginal,  case reported  In the first line of Table 16.
Male  participatlon  and mean  hours In  wage  work Increase  by 3.7 and  3 percent  respectively,  which Is much  less  than
the response  In the 'marginal'  case  (second  line).
We have  also carrded  out simulations  In which  MAXED  Is Increased.  The results  (not reponed  here)  show
a very small  Impact  on profits.- 34 -
Table 16. Changes In Participation Rates, Annual Hours of Work, Earnings and Consumption as a Result of Additional
Schooling  and Subsequent Increase In Wage Rates. (percentage changes from base case)
Sector spe-
citic an-  Wage
Sector specific  nual hours  earnings  Wage  Consump-
participation  of work (un-(uncondi-  earnings  tion
conditio-  tional)  (intis)  (intis)
Percentage increase  nan*l  (intis)
Wage work  Self-  Wage work  Self-
emDlovment  emplovment
F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M
Base case  .....  .......  0.32  0.62  0.34  0.35  414  1,165 414  492  2,300  8,100  17,900  27,800
Nine years of schooling  as
lower limit for females  ...  . 21.5  -1.8  1.2  -0.6  25.6  -2.7  -1.5  0  42.6  -2.0  8.4  6.5
Nine years of schooling  as
lower limit for males  .....  -3.5  5.6  0  -1.7  -4.4  6.7  0  -3.5  -5.0  14.8  11.2  7.6
Nine years of schooling  as
lower limit for both  males
and females  ...........  19.0  3.7  0.9  -1.4  20.5  3.0  -1.2  -2.4  33.9  11.1  17.3  11.2
Table 17. Effect of  Education on Mean Level and Inequality in the Distribution of  Per Capita Consumption among
Households with a Subsequent Increase in Wage Rates. (percentage changes from base case)
Mean  level  A-coefficient  Gini-coefficienit
Base case.  7600  0.566  0.438
Nine years of schooling  as lower
limit for  females .5.3  0  0
Nine years of schooling  as lower
limit for males .6.6  -1.8  -1.8
Nine years of schooling  as lower
limit for  both  males and females  10.5  -3.0  -3.2Earlier we  concluded  that  the  Impact of  wage  changes  on  Inequality in the  distribuilon  of  per  capita
consumption Is modest.  Table 17 demonstrates that this Is also the case when schooling  Is increased.  In spite of
a considerable Increase in mean per capita consumption, the reduction of Inequality in the distribution of per capta
consumption  Is surprisingly small.  Since the  changes In inequality are the  same whether  t  Is measured by the
C-in-coefficient or the A-coefficient, we can conclude that changes In schooling have the same impact on the lower
part of the distribution of  per capita consumption  as on the central part of this distribution.
6.  CONCLUSION
The  data  show  that  male  wages  play  a  dominant  role  In  household  consumptlon  In  Lima,  while
entrepreneurial Income is the most important income source in rural and In other urban areas.  In Lima males wage
earnings contribute by almost 40 percent of the household's consumption, which seems to reflect their share of total
household hoprs of work.  For females the corresponding shares are both about  17 percent. The same relationship
holds for rural areas.  Despite the similarity, consumption Is considerably less equally distributed than hours of work.
This is also the case when we examine the distribution of welfaie.  As an indicator of welfare we apply household
consumption  relative to  an equivalence scale.  This indicator accounts for some of the heterogeneity In household
demographic composition.
The estimated structural model departs from the assumption that the members of a household behave so
as  to  maximize a household  utility function,  given available work  resources  and production  opportunnites.  The
corresponding econometric approach dfffers from the traditional labor supply models in the literature.  Our particular
approach  has  the  advantage  of  being  well-suited  for  taking  Into  account  latent opportunity  constraints,  the
interdependence between each persons activities in different sectors, and the Interdependence between household
members.  Since many households have more than two adults, this Is a major challenge.
It may not  be obvious that the neoclassical type model  used in this analysis Is appropriate for examining
Peru's labor market.  The analysis rests on the assumption that the data reflects the heterogeneity of  preferences
and opportunities to a 'large'  extent.  For example, t may be questionable if essential background information about
the heterogeneity In customs and value systems across social classes, ethnic groups, and "professlons' is reflected
in the  data.  It Is also essential that the data on hours, participation and economic variables are not corrupted by
measurement errors. Such errors in economic variables may occur if, for instance, household members are engaged
in black-market activities, or if a substantial part of the goods  and labor markets operates by trading services and
goods  without explicit prices.  This is particularly relevant in countries where inflation Is high, as in Peru.  Also we
assume that the average number of feasible wage positions with low (offered) hours is the same as the number of- 36 -
feasible  wage posRtions  wRh  high offerec hours. Under  the assumption  that there are no restrictions  on hours of
work In the self-employment  sector,  It is possible  to test this assumption.
It we are willing  to accept  the neoclassical  point of departure  as well  as the assumptions  about the data
and the choice environment,  the estimation  results  reported  here demonstrate  that the parameters  are determined
with remarkable  precision  and have  the expected  signs  according  to economic  theory. The model  also reproduces
the aggregate  distributions  of hours and consumption  fairly well.
The simulation  results  for Lima demonstrate  that proportional  wage changes  have only a small effect  on
behavior  It is also remarkable  that  the wage increases  have  very little  effect  on the Inequality  In the distribution  of
per capita  consumption. Even  when  wage rates  are  increased  by the same  amount  the indirect  effect  is small. This
increase  does, however,  moderately  reduce  the inequality  In the distribution  of per capita consumption.
These  simulation  exercises  show  that it is very difficult  to reduce  inequality  in per capita  consumption  by
changing  wage and education  policies.- 37  -
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APPENDIX 1
Estimates of lneauality  based on the Gini coefficient
The tables below correspond with the following tables for the A-coefficient:  Table G1 corresponds to table
1, table  G2 corresponds to  the data on page 15, and table G3 to table 3.
Table G1.  GIni-inequality in Distribution of Hours of Work for Males and Married and Unmarried Females, by Region
Males  Females (15-70)
Region  (15-70)  All  Married  Unmarried
Peru ........  ............  .....  .249  .362  .364  .359
Uma ....  ...............  .251  .404  .426  .379
Other urban ........  ,  275  .404  .415  .387
Rural  ...........  ..............  .231  .318  .312  .328
Table G2.  Gini-Inequality In Distribution of Hours of Work among  Households, by  Region
Other
Peru  Uma  urban  Rural
0.344  0.349  0.351  0.320
(0.003)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)
Note:  Numbers In parenthesis are standard deviations.
Table G3.  Gini-Inequality in Distribution of Per Capita Consumption among Households  and Persons by  Region
Other
Consumption by  Peru  Uma  urban  Rural
Households  .....................  .787  .567  .830  .843
(.043)  (.021)  (.068)  (.048)
Persons ....  (.789)  .553  .835  .835
(.020)  (.010)  (.030)  (.023)
Note:  Numbers In parenthesis are standard deviations..39-
APPENDX  2
Definition  of main  varbibles
The model  used here follows  the definitions  in the Peru Livng Standards  Survey. We record  information
on the two most Important  jobs  held by -ach individual  in the last seven  days and In the last 12 months  prlor to the
survey.  Therefore  annual  hours of work and wage earnings  are  defined by (A.1)  and (A.2).
Table  Al.  Measures  of annual  hours of work and wage earnings
Last 7 days  Last 12 months
Weekly  Weekly  Weekly  Weekly
hours  wage  Number  hours  wage  Number
of work  earnings  of week  of work  earnings  of weeks
Main job .........  hi  k1 r1 h2 k2 r2
Second  job  ..  ..  h  3  k3 r3 h 4 k4  r4
4




(A.2) Annual  wage  earnings  =  E  ri  kL.
1=1
To illustrate  we show three possible  outcomes  of hL, h2, r,  and r2 in Table  A2.
Table  A2.  Three examples  of observations  of ma!n  jobs in the course of 12 months
Last 7 days  Last 12 months
Weekly  Weekly
hours  Number  hours  Number
Outcome  of work  of weeks  of work  of weeks
1  .40  50  0  0
2 .0  0  40  50
3  .,  . 40  28  30  24-40  -
Based  on wage earnings  and annual  hours of work, wage rate  Is given by:
wage rate  =  Annual  eamrinas
Annual hours of work In wage sector
Table A3 shows how profits  from farm and non-farm  production  are measured.
Table A3.  Measure of  profits from farm  and nonfarm production
Farm  Nonfarm
Revenue  TOTREV  RFVCONS
Expenses  EXFARM  =  (TOTINP  +  EXPENSES  =  (TOTAL  MTHLY
TPTLIVST)  EXPENSES*NO.  MTHS  ENTER-
PRISE  OPEN  IN LAST  YEAR)
Value  added  PROFARM  =  PROFITS  = REVCONS  - EXPENSES
TOTREV  - EXPFARM41
Figure  1.  Observed  and  simulated  distributions  of  annual  hours  of  work  for
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Figure  2.  Observed  and  simulated  distributions  of  annual  hours  of  work  for
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Figure  3.  Observed  and  simulated  distributions  of  per  capita  consumption  among






0  2000  4000  6000  8000





Figure  4.  Observed  and  simulated  distributions  of  hours  of  work  for
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Figure  5.  Observed  and  simulated  distributions  of  hours  of  work  for
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Figure  6.Observed  and  simulated  distributions  of  per  capita  consumption
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